10th Annual SF ISACA Fall Conference

October 4 – 6, 2010



## C13: Current Threats and Countermeasures – 2010 Lou Spahn, Accuvant, Inc.









- Usernames and Passwords
- Account information
- Patient Records

#### 1010 **FOCUS** 1010101010101010101010 1010 0102010 1 1010101010101010101010 barrastes Caster



### **Social Engineering – Phone Based**

Examples – IT / Admin Helpdesk:

Goal	Variances	Scenarios
Obtain Login Information to gain unauthorized access to a client environment	Can be performed with limited information (cold calling) or with client provided information (organization information or specific application information)	<ul> <li>Pretends to be a member of IT or helpdesk organization that needs to reset a password.</li> <li>Calls IT or Helpdesk organization pretending to be an employee with an expired or locked out account.</li> <li>Pretends to be part of a Beta application launch group and needs credentials for create account.</li> </ul>

<ul> <li>Examples – Custo</li> <li>Goal</li> </ul>	mer Facing Call Cent	er: Scenarios
Obtain or change client information from call center or helpdesk support organization	Can be performed with limited information (cold calling) or with client provided information (organization information or specific application information)	<ul> <li>Angry client mad at company or phone support staff.</li> <li>Hostile relationship (divorce or breakup) and not allowed access to papers or account information.</li> <li>Hostile situation where there is no access to a local branch, such as in another country.</li> <li>Just moved and does not have access to account information.</li> <li>Computer crashed and does not have access to account information.</li> <li>Computer crashed and does not have access to account information.</li> <li>Needs electronic copies of account statement sent (email or fax) for loan/mortgage/car background checks.</li> <li>Spouse calling on behalf of sick or hospitalized family member who has the account.</li> <li>Account locked out – failed online login process and need to re-enable the account.</li> <li>Missing last months statement and need a new copy sent.</li> <li>Errors in current statement and need and/or information resent.</li> </ul>



### **SE – Phone Based**

Dean's Story





	SE – Phone Based
Attacker: C	Okay, open your web browser, and type in this address; <u>http://68.177.222.133</u> .
Target: Oka	ay, I did this. I am getting a logon screen.
	Image: NVP Login - Mozilla Firefox       File       Edit       Yiew       Higtory       Cockmarks       Image: Cockmarks
	Username: Pass: Submit Query
	Done
Attacker: Is	s this the logon screen you use for the VPN connection?
Target: No,	I have not seen this logon screen before.
Attacker: V	Vhat happens when you put your username and password in?
1010 D FO	201011010101010101010101010101010101010



### Social Engineering – Email/Web (Phishing)

- Many people have seen the direct emails You've won \$1 million, or the dead relative in some random country
- Many people have seen the pop-up ads and other annoying junk on websites.
- Surprising that their guard is up if you just try one of these attacks, but in the last 2 years most successful attacks combine the 2 methods
- Accuvant averages 65% success rate with these types of attacks.









Dressing the part





### **Social Engineering – Physical**

Watch out for the security guards





## **Social Engineering – Physical**

Finally, remember to smile and wave as you leave







### Demonstration

Key Bump

### **Key Bumping Threat**

- High Level of Risk
  - Inexpensive
  - Inconspicuous
  - EASY
  - Few locks offer protection
    - Especially in the USA
      - Sidebars
      - Trap Pins
      - Shadow Drilling
  - Insurance problems





### **Key Bumping Countermeasures**

#### • With regard to keys:

- How long has it been since the establishment was rekeyed?
- Can all keys be accounted for?
- Do past employees or service providers still have a key?

#### • With regard to locks:

- Determine the value/risk of assets being protected?
- By smart
- Don't be cheap
- Don't just buy the most expensive?





### Demonstration

The Clone

## **RFID Defense Strategies**

• Follow the Basics:

As with all RF know your footprint and placements.

Follow the technology - upgrade when needed

Avoiding Being a Victim

-If you can't upgrade to a newer technology (such as I-Class) change out the entry panels with ones that use TAG+Passcode.



